). Joining these alternative slope changes (As = +, -, 0) with the negative change in level (AL = -) yields three models of revolutionary effects. For convenience, I have labeled them Conservative, Marxist, and Thermidorian. I would like to discuss the Conservative model first.
In the Conservative view, revolution is costly, both in the short and long run. This perspective appears to be widely held by Western scholars (Eckstein 1964 , p. 2; Greene 1974, p. 11) . For example, it would seem congruent with Huntington's (1968, pp. 308-9) assertion that the "economic results of a revolution are almost entirely negative." Beyond the initial disruption of productive forces, revolution inflicts enduring harm on a nation's capacity to produce. The adverse result of the first revolutionary shock is indicated by a drop in economic production: A' -A. The diminished slope of the line after the revolution represents the reduced ability of the nation to produce. Revolution, then, becomes a costly endeavor, both at the beginning and indefinitely into the future. Even the prerevolutionary level of output, at A', is not finally restored until point B. Thus, because of these joint short-and long-term effects, the detrimental influence might even extend over generations.
Perhaps the chief theoretical rival to the Conservative model is a Marxist one. According to Marxist theory, revolution creates necessary, substantial short-run costs but yields important long-run benefits. The Marxist revolu- tion, in reordering the ownership of the means of production, generates extreme social and economic dislocation, which immediately hurts production (as with the Russian case). However, the new relations established in the socialist society engender greater production of valued economic and social goods than was possible before.2 In this model, the initial revolutionary drop in output is precipitous (A' -A), but the new production curve is much steeper than previously. By point C production is back up to the prerevolutionary level. Still later, the new revolutionary forms have made output higher than would have been attainable without the revolution. Hence, according to the Marxist view, revolution makes up for its preliminary costs, ultimately serving to benefit society. A third perspective, inspired by Brinton's (1938, chap. 8) work on revolution, is the Thermidorian model. It differs from the previous two by emphasizing neither costs, as the Conservative model does, nor benefits, as the Marxist one does. Rather, the Thermidorian model stresses the return to "normalcy" which occurs after the initial revolutionary losses. At the beginning, there is the inevitable fall in production level (which is overcome by point D). However, prerevolutionary production rates are soon restored, a condition indicated by the absence of a slope change. This view of revolution occupies somewhat of a middle ground, for although development is delayed the society is brought back to health, to draw on Brinton's (1938, pp. 24-26) analogy.
There are, of course, other theoretical possibilities, beyond the Conservative, Marxist, and Thermidorian models diagramed in figure 3. While it seems likely that revolution exacts an initial production cost, one could postulate that the short-run effect is neutral (AL = 0) or even beneficial (AL = +). Further, it may be more realistic to suppose that the initial impact, whatever the direction, would be delayed, rather than immediate; for example, production may fall a year or two after the revolutionary takeover, as parts wear out and managers and technicians leave. In addition, the production curve might not be linear, as assumed. For instance, output over time often follows an exponential path. These alternative model specifications-a nonnegative change in level, a lagged short-run effect, a curvilinear production trend-are entertained later on. Thus, the theoretical structures in figure 3 serve as points of departure.
While the verbal description is, necessarily, sometimes vague or only illustrative, the models themselves provide rather precise rival predictions about revolutionary effects. How can they be tested with actual revolutionary data? Development of a satisfactory statistical model of revolutionary effects requires that the notion of "revolutions as experiments" be thoroughly explored. That is, revolutions ought to be consciously evaluated as social "treatments" with statistically analyzable effects. Following Campbell (1969) , who urges this view of reforms, a revolutionary treatment would be no more than quasi-experimental (Cook and Campbell 1976, pp. 223-24) . Affirming statistically significant relations can be problematic in the quasi-experimental design of interrupted time series (ITS), which is employed below.
Suppose that within an extended series of annual observations on economic production, a relatively discrete event, a revolution, occurs. I may observe that the level and rate of production appear to drop after the revolution (as the Conservative model would predict). The central statistical question is whether these production differences before and after the revolution are merely due to chance. More formally, are these changes in the level and slope of the production curve statistically significant, thereby ruling out (within acceptable probability limits) the possibility that they are random fluctuations?
This query can be answered through proper estimation of the following linear regression model (Campbell and Cook [1978] propose that an equation of this form generally be used to analyze the effect of intervention in a time series): Yt = bo + b1Xit + b2X2t + b3X3t + et, (1) where Yt = yearly observations on economic production; X1t = a counter for years from 1 to N, the number of observations; X2t = a dichotomous variable scored 0 for observations before the revolution and 1 for observations after the revolution; X3t = a counter of years scored 0 for observations before the revolution and 1, 2, 3, . . . for observations after the revolution; b0, bl, b2, b3 = parameters to be estimated; and et = error.
I would like to examine the meaning of the parameters in the model. The parameters bo and b1 estimate, respectively, the level and the slope of the time series before the revolution. The concern here is if the intervention of the revolution affects either of these parameters. Therefore, attention turns to b2, which estimates the change in level of the series after the revolutionary event, and b3, which estimates the change in slope after the revolutionary event. The null hypotheses of no change are, respectively, Ho: b2 = 0 and Ho: b3 = 0-. If the coefficient b2 is not significantly different from zero, one can reject the hypothesis of short-run revolutionary effect. Likewise, if b3 is not significant, the hypothesis of long-run revolutionary effect can be rejected. These hypotheses are tested in the data analysis which follows. In view of the above considerations, I use the CORC procedure to reestimate the ITS equation, after having logged sugar production (to the base e) and respecified the short-run effect hypothesis (hence, for X2t Further, nonlinearity has ceased to be troublesome. Besides the improvement in "fit," an inspection of the residual plot reveals no significant curvilinearity (i.e., the residuals are more or less randomly scattered across the time span).4 These tests encourage acceptance of the estimates in equation (3) (further assurance comes from ruling out a possible multicollinearity threat).5 4 In general, the closer the Durbin-Watson statistic, d, is to 2, the better. But the precise value for d at which the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is accepted varies with the level of significance, whether the test is one-or two-tailed, the sample size, and the number of independent variables. Here I have three independent variables, a 5% level of significance with a two-tailed test, and N = 54 (one of the original cases is necessarily lost with the CORC adjustments). Under these conditions, if the value of d lies between 1.60 (d1,) and 2.40 (4 -dy), as it does in this case, then the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation can be accepted (see Kelejian In his recent book on Cuba, economist Mesa-Lago singles out sugar, asserting that it "has had a discouragingly bad performance under the Revolution" (1974, p. 56) . While this evaluation is more nearly correct for the short run (1962), it certainly appears false for the long run. Indeed, if I were to generalize, in the fashion of Mesa-Lago, I would have to conclude that the revolution has had no effect on sugar production. What is more surprising, however, is the degree to which sugar production levels resist change, even in the face of serious government initiatives. This finding has profound implications for the formulation of Cuban development policy. It suggests that the best efforts of any Cuban government can heighten sugar output only marginally. Sugar production capacity may have reached a point where it is highly constrained by factors that the government cannot greatly alter, such as the island's agricultural and human resource base, not to mention international patterns of trade and dependency.
These findings fail to support any of the models of effect postulated earlier, although equation (3) David McClelland, in his imaginative work The Achieving Society, decided that electric energy production reliably indicated a nation's economic production (1961, pp. 82-87). McClelland selected electricity output as an indicator because he lacked adequate national income figures, as is also the case here. He reasoned that most of the productive machinery of contemporary societies would not run without electrical power (pp. 85-87). Therefore, electric output, as measured in kilowatt hours, would be an indicator of a nation's material production. This rather novel measurement appears to have substantial empirical validity, as evidenced by a correlation of .865 between per capita electricity production and the Watkins-Hagen estimates of per capita national income for a sample of 40 countries (McClelland 1961, p. 87). Hence, using electrical energy data to represent GNP, it may be possible to assess indirectly the revolution's contribution to Cuban economic growth. A series on electrical energy production can be assembled. However, the observations represent only public production, not total production (Mesa-Lago 1969b, p. 59). Since nationalization by the revolutionary government expanded the state sector, these figures would at least partially reflect the change to socialism, rather than real economic growth. But, there are also data on energy consumption, which McClelland equates with energy production (1961, p. 86). These figures on energy consumption include all consumption, public or private, and are thus not subject to the shortcomings of the energy production figures.
In the absence of adequate national accounts data, energy consumption is not a totally unreasonable proxy. Besides the empirical overlap with national income, indicated by McClelland, it has the advantage of being an unobtrusive measure. Energy consumption figures seem much less likely to be "fudged" than GNP figures, which easily lend themselves to propaganda purposes. Critic Mesa-Lago (1969b, p. 58) appears to accept electric energy statistics as accurate, thereby giving support to this inference. Further, an ITS analysis will resist various common sources of error.6
In addition to the foregoing arguments, the Cuban data themselves suggest that the energy consumption variable is tapping GNP. First, energy consumption is highly correlated with production in key Cuban industries for which data are available: with cement production, r = .84; cigarette production, r = .72; crude petroleum production, r = .77; motor fuel production, r = .70; kerosene production, r = .94; phosphate fertilizer consumption, r = .80; nitrogenous fertilizer consumption, r = .86; potash fertilizer consumption, r = .79.
More general evidence comes from a principal components analysis of all the production and consumption variables (23) on which I could assemble a more or less adequate series.7 While the first factor accounts for 53% of 7An interrupted time series must have "enough" pretreatment and posttreatment observations to permit meaningful application of the necessary statistical tests. The average series length is 37 observations for these Cuban data, with the last observation always from 1973 or 1974. With regard to missing data, the aim was to include just those series which contained no gaps (minor interpolation of one or two values was necessary for beer production, cigarette production, nitrogenous fertilizer consumption, motor fuel production, kerosene production, and phosphate fertilizer consumption). In addition to these, series were also gathered on the following production variables: beans, cement, chromium ore, cocoa, coffee, copper ore, corn, crude petroleum, electric energy, peanuts, rice, salt, sugar, and tobacco; and on these consumption variables: energy, newsprint, and potash fertilizer. These total to 23 variables. The agricultural production data were gathered from volumes of the following statistical yearbooks: International Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics (Rome: Institut International d'Agriculture, 1922-47); Yearbook of Food and the variance in the data, the remaining factors individually contribute little (e.g., the second factor adds only 10% more to the variance explained). Perhaps this first factor, which represents the best linear combination of all 23 variables, is a partial measure of national production. Interestingly, the variable having the highest factor loading is energy consumption, with .97.8 This extremely high loading indicates that, at least empirically, the energy consumption variable is equivalent to this production factor. Thus, I have some confidence that energy consumption is a workable substitute for GNP.
In As noted, the observations on energy consumption are expressed in "natural" logarithms (logs to the base e), while the independent variables, which are various measures of time, remain unlogged. This semilog transformation is especially useful when the concern is with assessing rates of economic growth. It tends to "straighten out" the observations, which in their raw form usually follow a curve that steepens over time. This linearization, of course, makes an OLS analysis more appropriate. But, in addition, the transformation allows the evaluation of percentage change, rather than absolute change. For example, if OLS were used to estimate a simple exponential model predicting energy consumption from time (in years), loge Yt = bo + b1Xjt + et, the interpretation would be that a one-year increment yields a (b1 X 100) percentage increase in energy consumption.9
With this understanding, the ITS estimates for energy consumption in equation (4) can be more fully considered. The slope, b1, estimates that energy consumption grew at a rate of 7.6% a year during the prerevolutionary period. As b3 indicates, after the revolution this rate was dampened by 3.2%, a significant decline. Therefore, under Castro the estimated annual energy consumption rate stands at 4.4%. How do these estimates compare with those of GNP growth? Ritter, in response to the serious data limitations, remarks: "Research on the Cuban economy is thus reduced to a type of detective work" (1974, p. vii) . I proceed in this spirit.
The only reliable national accounts statistics for the prerevolutionary period, according to Mesa-Lago (1969b, pp. 48-49), came from the National Bank, which reported an annual GNP growth rate in current prices for 1950-58 of 4.6%0. However, the preferred comparison would actually seem to be with GNP growth in constant prices, since energy consumption is measured in units of constant value (i.e., metric tons). Although the National Bank did not report GNP in constant prices, consumer price indices from Havana implied an inflation of 1. 1%o a year (Mesa-Lago 1971, p. 278). This figure suggests that the annual growth rate, in constant prices, was around 3.5%0 for the period. Accepting this estimate, one might infer a constant average positive error of 4. 1% a year (7.6% -3.5%) when using energy consumption growth to estimate real GNP growth. (This supposition is not entirely arbitrary. Even if GNP and energy consumption were perfectly correlated, the energy consumption-GNP conversion might well be inefficient.) Therefore, GNP growth, at constant prices, under the revolutionary government would be more correctly estimated at .3% annually.
However, this estimate in some sense exaggerates economic growth, for it does not control for population increase. Therefore, I reestimate ( growth rate was 7.0%, by my estimate. This preliminary production gain came largely from the increased demand made possible by income redistribution and from the greater use of already existing resources. However, these economic advances were shortly negated by trade difficulties, the scarcity of managers and materials, and administrative error. In fact, looking across the entire Castro period, I estimate the annual rate of real per capita GNP growth at -1.8%, compared with 1.0% for the prerevolutionary era.
Nevertheless, even granting that the economic growth rate has fallen during the revolutionary years, the inference that Castro's policies are responsible for the decline is hasty. While the Cuban government obviously directs the Cuban economy, there are external influences over which it has little control. Of overwhelming importance here is U.S. policy. Specifically, what has been the impact of the U.S. embargo? In the case at hand, the imposition of the embargo is almost coincident with the revolution and so may share responsibility for the drop in economic output. Ideally, revolutionary effects should be tested in the absence of an embargo.
This ideal circumstance prevailed during the first year of the revolution. Throughout 1959, international trade relations followed the prerevolutionary pattern (serious U.S. economic reprisals began in 1960 with reduction of the sugar quota in July and the imposition of a partial embargo in October). Thus, a partial test of revolutionary effects, disentangled from the embargo, is found in the short-run effect coefficient, b2, of eq. (5). As discussed, in this first year growth was significantly greater than for 1958. Also, sugar production held steady, with no indication of a drop from the previous year (b2 = .03 1, t = .146). However, the embargo soon led to serious shortages of raw materials and replacement parts for industry, and output slowed. Hence, the temptation is to attribute the long-run production decrease to persisting effects of the embargo. But, at about the same time the embargo was taking hold, important internal changes in Cuba were occurring, for example, the transition to a socialist state was being completed, and the Soviet Union was assuming a major role. Therefore, by the 1960-61 period, major variables potentially influencing growth are once again confounded. Nevertheless, the brief 1959 experiment hints at the revolutionary possibilities for positive economic growth. Without a doubt, the subsequent decline was at least partially caused by the far-reaching economic reorientation that the U.S. sanctions required and cannot fairly be ascribed solely to the Castro government.
To what extent can one expect the Cuban findings to hold for other revolutions? Is the impact on Cuba different from the impact on Russia? Or France? Perhaps, as the Cuban case suggests, the consequences of revolution vary according to the nation's size and international dependency. It may be that its effects are associated with the initial economic development level of the country or with the social origins of the revolutionary leadership. To the degree that such conditions pertain, unqualified inferences from the Cuban experience to the universe of revolutions are unwarranted. Clearly, in building a theory of effects, more revolutions must be studied, and the implication is that statistical interactions must be seriously Entertaining the idea of different models for different sets of dependent variables throws into sharp relief the complexity of the perennial question of social philosophers, "Is revolution worthwhile?" Even if this question could somehow be answered for each sector-the economic, the social, and the political-it would persist at a higher level. For instance, what would be the objective criteria for determining that the social benefits of revolution outweighed the political costs? Premier Castro, in a 1971 speech in Chile, declared that "the accomplishments-of a revolution are not to be measured only in stones; they are not to be measured only in factories. They are to be measured in these, but essentially they ought to be measured in moral and human terms" (as quoted in Matthews 1975, p. 439). I share Castro's concern that all the outcomes of revolution, the moral along with the material, be measured. But evaluating the worth of a revolution ultimately reaches beyond measurement of the relevant variables. Even after all the various revolutionary outcomes are accurately recorded, it remains to be asked, "Which do I prefer?" and "How much do I prefer them?" These questions, of course, force us to look beyond the methodology of this paper.
